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Trial by jury in civil proceedings: “convenience” and the philosophy of the 
UCPR 
 
In Syddall v National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Limited [2008] QSC 101 
Daubney J ordered the action be tried without a jury.  
 
His judgment considered the circumstances in which a trial involves any technical, 
scientific or other issue that can not be “conveniently” considered and resolved by a 
jury as provided in r 474 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (“UCPR”). 
 
Facts 
 
The plaintiff was a self-represented litigant. He sought liquidated damages in excess 
of $3.1 million against the defendant insurer, and also compensation for losses he 
claimed had been suffered by him and his family. 
 
The liquidated claim was for money allegedly due to the plaintiff under a disability 
insurance policy. The plaintiff pleaded that the relevant policy was first taken out in 
1993, was varied or replaced in 1995, and that a new policy issued at that time. He 
alleged that he suffered a total disability for the purposes of the policy on 27 
November 2000. The claim had been declined.  
 
The proceeding also involved questions about the validity of the purported 
cancellation of the policy by the insurer, and the purported avoidance of the policy 
under s 29 of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) on the grounds of fraudulent 
misrepresentations and non-disclosures.  The plaintiff elected in his pleading for a 
trial by jury. The defendant applied for an order that the action be tried without a jury. 
 
Legislation 
 
Rule 474 of the UCPR provides: 
474 The Court may order a trial without a jury if:  
(a) the trial requires a prolonged examination of records; or 
(b) involves any technical, scientific or other issue that can not be 
conveniently considered and resolved by a jury. 
 
Rule 5 of the UCPR provides, so far as relevant: 
5(1) The purpose of these rules is to facilitate the just and expeditious 
resolution of the real issues in civil proceedings at a minimum of expense. 
(2) Accordingly, these rules are to be applied by the courts with the objective 
of avoiding undue delay, expense and technicality and facilitating the purpose 
of these rules. 
 
Submission 
 
Counsel for the defendant identified a number of issues which he submitted would 
involve a prolonged examination of documents, including questions about: whether 
the plaintiff had misrepresented his net income or his medical history in either his 
1993 or his 1995 applications for insurance, the nature of the plaintiff’s occupation at 
various times and whether there had been misrepresentation in that regard, and 
whether the injury in November 2000 was such as to cause the plaintiff to be unable 
to perform at least one of the duties of each of his occupations. 
 
It was further submitted that the documents to be examined for the purpose of 
determining the issues included: tax returns for the plaintiff and his family trust and 
associated financial documents over a period of numerous years from 1993, hospital 
records relating to his treatment for various conditions and incorporating an extended 
period before he took out the initial policy in 1993, numerous accounts and 
accounting records, Centrelink records, commission statements, rate books, cheque 
butts, correspondence and business invoices over many years, and affidavits 
previously filed in the proceeding. 
 
Analysis 
 
Daubney J referred to the decision of Mullins J in Smit v Chan [2003] 2 Qd R 431. In 
that case her Honour had noted that the discretion conferred by r 474 must be 
exercised having regard to the provisions of the rule itself and its purpose within its 
division in the UCPR.  
 
With reference to a submission made to her that the rule should be interpreted having 
regard to the purpose of the UCPR set out in rule 5, she said: 
“Where there is no statutory bar to a trial by a jury, Div 1 of Part 3 of Chapter 
13 of the UCPR provides for trial by jury as an alternative mode of trial 
without a jury in the circumstances provided for in that division. That means 
that, even though trial by jury is accepted as involving greater expense and 
longer trial for the parties, trial by jury is maintained by the UCPR as a mode 
of trial. Recourse to rule 5(1) cannot detract from or displace the continued 
existence of that mode of trial as one means for the resolution of civil 
proceedings.” 
 
Although agreeing with her Honour’s conclusion, Daubney J said that consideration 
of attainment of the objectives in rule 5(1) and (2) will be relevant considerations for 
a judge, at least in the exercise of the discretion under r 474(b). He referred in this 
context to the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Beta Construction Ltd v 
Channel 4 Television Co Ltd [1990] 1 WLR 1042. That case involved a consideration 
of the then applicable UK legislation about the entitlement to a jury trial.  
 
In relation to the word “conveniently” in the relevant subsection Stuart-Smith LJ 
(with whom Ralph Gibson LJ agreed) followed authorities which concluded that the 
legislature was directing its attention to the efficient administration of justice, more so 
than to the probable difficulty or otherwise of the issue involved. Daubney J said that 
the legislation was sufficiently similar for the considerations referred to in that case to 
be pertinent to the application of r 474 of the UCPR.  
 
Daubney J also referred to four main areas which Stuart-Smith LJ had enumerated in 
which the administration of justice may be rendered less than convenient if the trial 
takes place with a jury. The consideration and application of those four factors by a 
judge at first instance had been affirmed on appeal in Taylor v Atherton [1995] 1 
WLR 447 per Bingham MR. They were: 
(a) the physical problem of handling, in the confines of the jury box, large 
bundles of documents or documents that are so bulky that they cannot be 
conveniently looked at; 
(b) the question of prolongation of the trial, which “not only uses scare research in 
court and judge time, so that they are not available for other litigants, but it 
adds significantly to the burden of costs to be borne by the parties”; 
(c) The question of expense, both in relation to the making of copies and because 
justice may be denied to one or both of the parties if the cost of the litigation is 
to be significantly increased because of trial by jury as opposed to judge alone; 
and 
(d) The risk that the jury may not sufficiently understand the issues on the 
documents or accounts to resolve them correctly. 
 
Daubney J concluded that, at least when considering the effective and efficient 
administration of justice in the context of the issue of “convenience” under r 474(b) it 
was appropriate for the Court to have regard, in the exercise of its discretion, but not 
as a fetter thereon, to the philosophy and objectives of the UCPR enshrined in r 5(1) 
and (2). 
 
The judge was satisfied the trial of the matter before him would require a prolonged 
examination of records. He also thought the issues identified by the defendant’s 
counsel were not ones which could be “conveniently” (in the sense he had described) 
considered and resolved by a jury.  
 
He said there was a risk to that the efficient administration of justice would be 
deleteriously affected if those issues were left to trial by jury. It was also likely that 
the enlarged time for the conduct of a jury trial would be significantly expanded 
further because of the nature of these issues and the need to understand and determine 
them in the documentary evidentiary context which the defendant would seek to 
advance. This would inexorably lead to a significant increase in costs. The judge was 
also persuaded that the questions for determination and the process of determination 
by reference to documents, favoured a mechanism by which the reasons for judgment 
are fully exposed and amenable, if required, to review on appeal, i.e. trial by judge 
alone. Consistent with these conclusions, it was ordered that the proceeding be tried 
without a jury. 
 
Comment 
 
It has been noted that Daubney J expressed his agreement with the conclusion of 
Mullins J in Smit v Chan [2003] 2 Qd R 431 that recourse to r 5(1) cannot detract 
from or displace the continued existence of that mode of trial as one means for the 
resolution of civil proceedings.  
 
However, this judgment clearly gives the philosophy of the rules as expressed in r 5 a 
more significant influence on the determination of an application under r 474 than did 
that of Justice Mullins in Smit v Chan (even though Mullins J had nevertheless been 
satisfied that the case before her was a proper one for exercising the discretion given 
by r 474 to order a trial without a jury).  
 
The complexities of modern litigation are such that for those proceedings for which 
the right to a jury trial has not been excluded by statute it will be increasingly difficult 
for a party electing for a trial by jury in civil proceedings to resist successfully the 
making of an order under r 474. 
 
 
 
